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Intent v. Impact: The Standard of
Proof Necessary to Establish a




During the past decade, thousands of civil rights suits have
been filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Although the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted these statutes, it has not yet
announced the standard of proof necessary to establish a prima
facie case of race discrimination under them. Following an in-
depth examination of the "impact" and "intent" standards, as
well as the language, purpose, and legislative history of the vari-
ous civil rights statutes, the author concludes that the Court is
likely to require proof of intentional discrimination to sustain a
prima facie case under sections 1981 and 1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
For over 100 years after its enactment, the Civil Rights Act of
18661 was all but ignored as a vehicle for challenging race discrim-
ination. During this period, United States Supreme Court deci-
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of
San Diego School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan, 1968; J.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1971; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1978.
1. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866
contained several other provisions, this article will focus only on § 1 of the Act
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976)), which guaranteed all citizens
the same rights as white citizens to make and enforce contracts and to purchase,
lease, and convey real and personal property.
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sions rendered the 1866 Act impotent by severely limiting its
scope and application.2 However, since 1968 a number of Su-
preme Court decisions3 have breathed new life into section 1 of
the 1866 Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. These de-
cisions have held not only that sections 1981 and 1982 prohibit
government-authorized race discrimination, but that they also
prohibit race discrimination resulting from purely private con-
duct.4 Moreover, the Court has liberally construed the reach of
these statutes to extend to a variety of relationships and discrimi-
natory acts.5
As a result of these recent cases, there has been an explosion in
the use of sections 1981 and 1982 by civil rights litigants. 6 As
courts have applied these sections to more subtle and varied
forms of race discrimination, numerous new substantive and pro-
cedural issues have arisen regarding their scope and application.7
The Supreme Court has ultimately resolved many of these is-
sues.8 But one such issue remains, and it is of primary impor-
tance to the continued viability of sections 1981 and 1982 as
meaningful weapons against both private and governmental race
discrimination. This issue concerns the standard of proof a plain-
tiff must satisfy to establish a prima facie case of race discrimina-
tion under these statutes.9
As will be discussed and examined in more detail below,'0 the
2. E.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323
(1926); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). For discussion of these cases, see
text accompanying notes 16-17 infra.
3. E.g., McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
(1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968).
5. See cases cited note 3 supra.
6. In sharp contrast to the first 100 years of its existence, the number of cases
involving the 1866 Act during the past 10 years has been in the thousands.
7. As will be further discussed in pt. II infra, many of these issues have
arisen because of the uncertain relationship between the 1866 Act and more recent
civil rights statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
243 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.).
8. For a discussion of some of these procedural and substantive issues, see
pt. II infra.
9. Although such words as "standard of proof" and "prima facie case" refer to
procedural and evidentiary issues, they also strike at the substantive heart of
§§ 1981 & 1982. What is actually involved is the question of what facts a plaintiff
must prove to sustain a finding, in the absence of an appropriate justification by
the defendant, of unlawful race discrimination in violation of § 1981 or § 1982. Un-
less the plaintiff meets this threshold of proof, the plaintiff's case will fail and the
burden of justification will never shift to the defendant.
10. See pt. II infra.
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courts have basically two choices with respect to this issue. One
choice is to require that a plaintiff alleging race discrimination
must in all cases prove that the defendant has engaged in pur-
poseful or intentional race discrimination. The other choice is to
require that the plaintiff need prove only that the challenged pol-
icy or practice, regardless of the defendant's intent or motivation,
has resulted in a disproportionately adverse racial impact or ef-
fect.
The choice between an "intent" standard and an "impact" (or
"effects")" standard is more than one of semantics. Because race
discrimination in today's society is often subtle and covert, a re-
quirement of proof of intentional or purposeful discrimination
would severely limit the effectiveness of the 1866 Act. By con-
trast, an "impact" standard concerns only the consequences of a
defendant's conduct, policy, or practice and will allow a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case by objective statistical evidence.' 2
This article will focus on the appropriate standard of proof
under section 1981, although much of its analysis is also relevant
to section 1982. What follows is a discussion of the historical
background and present significance of section 1981, a more pre-
cise explanation of the differences between the "intent" and "im-
pact" standards, the current status of the section 1981 standard in
the lower federal courts, an analysis of the arguments for and
against each standard, and some tentative conclusions on how the
Supreme Court is likely to rule on this issue.' 3
11. The "impact" and "effects" designations refer to the same standard and
are interchangeable.
12. Since the adoption of more recent civil rights legislation in the 1960's, race
discrimination has become less obvious and open. Defendants are not likely to ad-
mit that race was a motivating factor in their decisions or actions. Consequently,
race discrimination is more difficult to prove if motivation or intent is a required
element of the claim.
Moreover, many employers and landlords, for example, apply policies and prac-
tices to blacks and whites alike without any racially discriminatory intent or pur-
pose. Nonetheless, these facially race-neutral policies and practices often have the
effect of arbitrarily screening out disproportionately higher percentages of racial
minorities than of whites. It is particularly this category of discriminatory conduct
that the "impact" standard will allow a plaintiff to reach and to force a defendant
to justify.
13. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in at least one case that raises
this issue. See Davis v. County Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978).
]1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF
SECTION 1981
Congress originally enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as part of section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,14 pursuant to section 2 of the thir-
teenth amendment.15 Early Supreme Court interpretations of
section 1 of the 1866 Act greatly limited its scope and reach in two
general ways. First, although the Court's analysis often was con-
fusing and dictum, the Court held the 1866 Act to apply only to
government-authorized race discrimination.16 Second, the Court
held that because Congress enacted the 1866 Act to enforce the
thirteenth amendment, the 1866 Act prohibited only a narrow
range of conduct that, in effect, actually constituted perpetuation
of slavery.' 7
However, in the landmark decision of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,'8 the Supreme Court distinguished these earlier cases and
specifically held that section 1982, also derived from section 1 of
the 1866 Act, applies to race discrimination resulting from purely
private conduct.' 9 The Court also held that the 1866 Act applies
14. See note 1 supra. Congress reenacted § 1 of the 1866 Act in the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. Section 1 was codified in §§ 1977 & 1978 of the
Revised Statutes of 1874, which are now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1976).
Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 2. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section . Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall ex-
ist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
16. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 78-81 (1917); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); Virginia v.
Rive, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1879).
17. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1906); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
18. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19. The correctness of this ruling was, and still is, hotly debated by the mem-
bers of the Court, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192 (1976) (White, J., dis-
senting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), as well as by numerous legal scholars, see, e.g., 6 HISTORY OF TiE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at
1217-19; Ervin, Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L.
REv. 485 (1969); Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing
Lines, 82 HARV. L REV. 63, 95 (1968); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An His-
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not merely to a narrowly defined notion of the badges and inci-
dents of slavery but prohibits a variety of acts and practices with
a scope as broad as the language of the Act.20
Although Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. involved only section
1982, it was clear that the Court's reasoning was equally applica-
ble to section 1981. The Court expressly so held in Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency 21 and in Runyon v. McCrary.22
The Jones decision is of great significance because it extends
the 1866 Act to private discrimination and broadens its coverage.
However, the impact of sections 1981 and 1982 in civil rights litiga-
tion was initially not as great as one might have expected. This
was partially due to the existence of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
and 1968, which contained more comprehensive legislation deal-
ing with race and other types of discrimination. 23 For example,
because the provisions of section 1981 and of title VII of the 1964
Act overlap in prohibiting racial discrimination in employment,
the interrelationship between these two statutes created much
initial confusion 2 4 Uncertainty as to whether a plaintiff proceed-
toric Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV. 475 (1968); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 284
(1969); Levinson, New Perspective on the Reconstruction Court, 26 STAN. L REV.
461 (1974). Much of the debate centers on the legislative history of §§ 1981 & 1982
and on whether, because of their reenactment in the Enforcement Act of 1870 (see
note 14 supra) after ratification of the fourteenth amendment, they can appropri-
ately be considered thirteenth amendment statutes. It has even been argued that
whereas § 1982 is more clearly a thirteenth amendment statute, § 1981 may in fact
be at least partially based on the fourteenth amendment. See Note, Towards an
Integrated Society-The New Section 1981, 1976 A=uz. ST. L.J. 549.
20. 392 U.S. at 440-43 & n.78.
21. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
22. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
23. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18, 25, 28, 42 U.S.C.). Title VII of the 1964 Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)), prohibits em-
ployment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Title VII was extensively amended by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections
of 5,42 U.S.C.). Discrimination in public accommodations is prohibited by title II,
the Public Accommodations title, of the 1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(1976). Likewise, discrimination in the sale and rental of housing is prohibited by
the Fair Housing titles of the 1968 Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3535, 3601-3631 (1976)).
24. The legislative history of the 1964 Act shows that Congress did not intend
it to repeal or preempt § 1981. On two occasions, the Senate has defeated amend-
ments to make title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. See
110 CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964); 118 CONG. REC. 3371-73 (1972). See also H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971).
ing under section 1981 must exhaust the administrative remedies
required under the 1964 Act and whether the same kinds of in-
junctive and monetary relief would be available, combined with
lack of administrative discovery and explicit provisions for attor-
neys' fees, resulted in few cases proceeding solely under section
1981.
However, the federal courts have now better defined the rela-
tionship between section 1981 and the more recent Civil Rights
Acts. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,25 the Supreme
Court held that section 1981 and title VII of the 1964 Act are sepa-
rate, distinct, and independent causes of action that augment
each other and are not mutually exclusive. 26 Since this ruling,
section 1981 has had an important independent vitality even in
general areas of overlapping statutory coverage, such as employ-
ment discrimination. In fact, there are significant advantages to
proceeding under section 1981. For example, section 1981 does not
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, whereas un-
der title VII a claimant must file an administrative charge within a
specified time and then exhaust the delay-ridden procedures of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) prior
to commencing litigation.27
The remedies available to a section 1981 plaintiff are at least as
25. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
26. Id. at 459-61. Previously, in Tllman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973), the Court had held that title II of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976), does not repeal or preempt §§ 1981 & 1982.
27. A claimant proceeding under title VII must file an administrative charge of
discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act if
no appropriate state or local fair employment agency exists. The claimant must
file within 300 days if such an agency does exist. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). Upon receiving a timely charge, the EEOC must in-
vestigate to determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe the charge is
true. Id. § 706(b), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1978).
The statute requires that the investigation be completed within 120 days of receiv-
ing the charge, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2060e-5(b) (1976); but
in practice the investigation takes substantially longer to complete. If the EEOC
finds reasonable cause, it must attempt to conciliate the charge informally. Id. If
conciliation attempts fail, the claimant may commence litigation within 90 days af-
ter receiving a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. Id. § 706(f) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1).
The claimant may shorten this administrative process by demanding notification
of right to sue after the charge has been filed for 180 days regardless of whether
the EEOC has taken any action. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1978). In addition, the
Supreme Court has held in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
that timely filing of charges with the EEOC by the plaintiff and timely commence-
ment of litigation upon receipt of the EEOC's notice of right to sue satisfy the title
VII jurisdictional prerequisites.
By contrast, a plaintiff proceeding under § 1981 need not exhaust EEOC or other
administrative remedies prior to commencing an action in federal court even when
pleading both § 1981 and title VII violations. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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broad as those available to a title VII plaintiff and are more exten-
sive in some cases. Under section 1981, as under title VII, a plain-
tiff can obtain class-wide injunctive relief as well as back pay.28
But unlike title VII, section 1981 does not restrict an award of
back pay to any specific period.29 In addition, a plaintiff can ob-
tain compensatory and punitive damages under section 1981 but
not under title VIL30 Moreover, because a section 1981 plaintiff
need not exhaust EEOC administrative remedies, nothing pre-
vents that plaintiff from seeking immediate temporary injunctive
relief in federal court. Finally, with the enactment of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, a successful plaintiff
under section 1981 may now obtain an award of attorneys' fees to
much the same extent as under title VII.31
Moreover, the 1964 and 1968 Acts exempt certain categories of
defendants from their coverage, but the language of section 1981
contains no such exemptions. 32 More important, section 1981 may
apply to certain substantive areas of employment discrimination
that have been judicially determined to be excluded from attack
under title VII. One such area involves seniority plans. In a
number of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that
28. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
29. Id. at 460. An award of back pay under title VII cannot extend back more
than two years prior to the filing of the administrative charge with the EEOC.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
30. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), the Court
held that compensatory and punitive damages are available to a § 1981 plaintiff.
The weight of authority seems to indicate that they are not available under title
VII. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. Section 706(k) of the 1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), authorizes a
district court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. As
a practical matter, the lack of such explicit fees authorization in the 1866 Act made
proceeding under § 1981 much less attractive than under title VIL This lack of au-
thorization for attorneys' fees may help explain why private litigants continued to
exhaust title VII administrative prerequisites in employment discrimination cases
rather than immediately commence litigation based solely on § 1981. Now, with
the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. I No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)), a district court is author-
ized to award attorneys' fees in its discretion to the prevailing party in actions
based on certain civil rights statutes, including §§ 1981, 1982, & 1983.
32. For example, title VII does not apply to employers who employ fewer than
15 employees, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Title II
exempts private clubs from its coverage, id. § 201(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). The lan-
guage of § 1981 contains no such exemptions, and there is no indication that the
1964 Act will be treated as impliedly limiting § 1981. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Ha-
yen Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
under section 703(h)33 of title VII, bona fide seniority systems are
not unlawful even though they perpetuate the discriminatory ef-
fects of pre-title VII race discrimination. 34 Although such senior-
ity systems enjoy a high degree of immunization from title VII
challenges because of section 703(h), they are not necessarily im-
mune from attack by claims based on section 1981.35
Thus even in those areas in which the more recent civil rights
statutes overlap with section 1981, there are several significant
reasons for the importance of section 1981 as an independent
cause of action.36 However, the language of section 1981 does not
limit its scope to race discrimination in employment or in hous-
ing. Section 1981 applies to all contractual relationships and thus
is potentially much broader than the provisions prohibiting race
discrimination in the 1964 and in subsequent Civil Rights Acts.3 7
The Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary38 has already ap-
plied section 1981 to prohibit race discrimination in the admission
practices of private, non-sectarian schools. Lower federal courts
have extended section 1981 to claims of race discrimination in a
wide variety of contexts, including hospital admissions,39 insur-
ance,40 access to recreational facilities, 41 utility security depos-
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
34. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Trans World Airlines the Court held that § 703(h) is
a definitional provision and that absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of
a seniority plan cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the plan has
discriminatory consequences. In Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977), the Court indicated that the pre-Act/post-Act distinction applies to
other allegedly discriminatory practices.
35. See, e.g., De Graffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th
Cir. 1977). But see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Watkins v. United States Steel Workers Local 2369, 516
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. For a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of the present vitality of
§ 1981 as an independent remedy, in light of the more recent civil rights legislation,
see Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy'" The Civil Rights Acts of 1865
and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 So. CAI.. L. REv. 961
(1977).
37. The 1964 and subsequent Civil Rights Acts are more comprehensive in the
sense that they prohibit discrimination based on sex, religion, and national origin,
as well as on race and on color. In addition to the provisions of titles 11 and VII of
the 1964 Act and of title VIII of the 1968 Act, see note 23 supra, title IV of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), provides remedies for discrimina-
tion in education, as do the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1976). Title VI of the 1964 Act prohibits discrimination in federal programs. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
38. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
39. E.g., United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969).
40. E.g., Ortego v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Sims v. Order
of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972).
41. E.g., Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Scott v.
Young, 421 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
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its,42 the delivery of county services, 43 the grant of automobile
franchises,44 and police misconduct. 45 In fact, few areas of private
or government-authorized race discrimination cannot be consid-
ered contractual in nature or do not come under the other broad
language of section 1981. Consequently, the question of what
standard of proof is necessary to establish a prima facie case
under section 1981 is one of far-reaching importance and effect.
Ell. INTENT V. IMPACT: THE Two STANDARDS DEFINED
Until recently, the distinction between the "intent" and "im-
pact" standards has never received much attention in civil rights
litigation. To appreciate fully the significance of this choice of
section 1981 standards, it is necessary to examine how the federal
courts have defined and applied each standard.
Although occasional Supreme Court decisions involving race
discrimination and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause have indicated that disparate racial impact raises an infer-
ence of discrimination,4 6 the "impact" or "effects" standard first
took on real meaning in the context of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.47 In the seminal civil rights decision of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,48 the Supreme Court held that a showing of racially
discriminatory effect by itself is sufficient to prove a prima facie
case under title VII.
In Griggs, the plaintiffs, black employees, challenged the de-
fendant company's policies of requiring either a high school di-
ploma or a passing score on a standardized general intelligence
test as a prerequisite of employment in or transfer to certain jobs
in the company.4 9 There was no showing that the defendant
adopted or applied its diploma and test requirements with a ra-
42. Cody v. Union Elec. Co., 518 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1975).
43. E.g., Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976).
See also Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Sud v. Import Motors, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
45. E.g., Milburn v. Girard, 441 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also Wiley v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
46. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
48. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
49. Id. at 425-28.
cially discriminatory purpose or intent.5 0 The plaintiffs' only evi-
dence was that these requirements, although applied to blacks
and whites alike, disqualified a disproportionately greater number
of black than of white employees. 51 The Court found this evi-
dence sufficient to prove a prima facie case under title VII.
Referring to the language and the legislative history of title VII,
the Court first ruled that the 1964 Act prohibits practices, proce-
dures, and tests neutral on their face and in intent if they are dis-
criminatory in operation.5 2 The Court stated that title VII was
directed at the consequences and effects of employment prac-
tices, not simply at the defendant's motivation.5 3 The Court then
noted that even good intent or the absence of discriminatory in-
tent does not redeem an employment procedure or test that has a
racially discriminatory effect unless the defendant proves the pro-
cedure or test is job-related and justified by business necessity.54
A three-step process for assigning burdens of proof in title VII
cases has evolved from Griggs and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.5 5 First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case. To do so, the plaintiff must show that the em-
ployment practice in question has a racially discriminatory ef-
fect.5 6 The plaintiff may prove disproportionate impact solely by
use of statistics, including analysis of the actual results of the de-
fendant's policies and practices, or by reliance on general popula-
tion demographic data.57
50. Id. at 428-29.
51. The only evidence the Supreme Court considered was statistical. With re-
spect to the diploma requirement, the Court looked at census figures for North
Carolina (the location of the defendant's plant), which indicated that only 12% of
the state's black males, as compared to 34% of the state's white males, had com-
pleted high school. Id. at 430 n.6. With respect to the standardized tests, the
Court noted that whereas 58% of the whites passed such tests, only 6% of the
blacks passed. Id.
52. Id. at 430-31.
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 431-32, 436.
55. Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court
has on several occasions reapplied the "effects" test under title VII. E.g., Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Although
the Court at times has seemed to back away from a pure "impact" test, see Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and has carved out exceptions regard-
ing seniority plans based on the statutory language of § 703(h) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), see cases cited note 32 supra, the Court
has recently reaffirmed the basic "effects" test in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977).
56. Of course, the plaintiff can establish a violation of title VII by proving in-
tentional or purposeful discrimination. The elements of a prima facie case of in-
tentional race discrimination under title VII are discussed in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
57. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
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Once the plaintiff has shown that a facially neutral employment
practice has a disproportionate adverse racial impact, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice has a
manifest relation to the job in question and is thus justified by
business necessity.58 If the employer then proves that the chal-
lenged practice is job-related, the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff to show that other selection devices without a similar
discriminatory effect are available and will serve the employer's
legitimate interests as well as the challenged practice.59
The significance of this "effects" test in title VII litigation can-
not be understated. As a direct result of the Griggs standard,
hundreds of federal court decisions have held that employment
practices, neutral on their face and in application, violate title VII
because they have a disproportionate adverse racial impact and
are not justified by business necessity. Relying solely on statisti-
cal evidence and without any inquiry into the defendant em-
ployer's intent, courts have enjoined the use of various
standardized intelligence tests,60 high school and college diploma
requirements, 61 minimum height and weight requirements, 62 poli-
cies disqualifying applicants with arrest or conviction records,63
background investigations,64 policies disqualifying employees
with more than one garnishment,65 and other facially neutral em-
ployment practices. Moreover, courts have adopted the "effects"
58. Id. at 329; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). For tests cov-
ered by the EEOC guidelines on employee selection procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1978), the defendant must show that the challenged tests have been empirically
validated in accordance with the guidelines. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
59. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
60. E.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 429 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Padilla v. Stringer,
395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974); Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 65, 353 F. Supp.
22 (M.D. Ohio 1972), modified on other grounds, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973).
62. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Laffey v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d
1334 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. E.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v.
Litton Syss., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972). See also Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
64. E.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 432 (7th Cir. 1977).
65. E.g., Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See also Wal-
lace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
test as the standard of proof necessary to make out a prima facie
case under other titles of the recent Civil Rights Acts.66
In contrast to the "effects" (or "impact") standard, the "intent"
standard in most instances requires that the plaintiff prove more
than mere disproportionate adverse impact to make out a prima
facie case. The requirement of proof of intentional or purposeful
discrimination under the Constitution is not new, and several
Supreme Court decisions have required such proof in school de-
segregation cases.67 However, not until two recent decisions,
Washington v. Davis68 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp.,69 has the Supreme Court ex-
tensively discussed the requirement of proof of intent.
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that in order
to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the
fifth amendment, a plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful
race discrimination.70 The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the
District of Columbia police department's written personnel test,
which excluded a disproportionately high number of black appli-
cants. The plaintiffs asserted that because the test had a dispa-
rate racial impact, the defendants' use of the test violated the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution.71 The Court held
that the title VII standards are not applicable to constitutional
analysis and that therefore the defendant's facially neutral em-
ployment test was not invalid solely because it had a dispro-
portionate adverse racial impact. The Court noted that
disproportionate impact is not irrelevant to proof of intentional
discrimination but generally will not, by itself, be sufficient to
prove such intent.72
The Supreme Court further defined this "intent" standard in
66. E.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 1458 (1978) (title VIII); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)); Smith v.
Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d
819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). Contra, Boyd v. Lefrak Org'n, 509
F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) (title VIII).
67. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-08 (1973).
68. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Washington v. Davis is also important because it is an
employment discrimination case and thus has had an impact on other such cases
involving § 1981. See pts. IV & V infra.
69. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-42.
71. Id. at 232-37. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of § 1981 and D.C. Code
§ 1-320. As will be discussed in detail infra, the Court did not determine the ap-
propriate standard of proof for these statutory claims. See notes 99-123 and accom-
panying text infra.
72. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-42.
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Arlington Heights,73 in which the Court held that proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is necessary to establish a prima
facie case of race discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.74 The Court ruled that to
shift the burden of justification to the defendant, a plaintiff need
not prove that the challenged action rested solely on a racially
discriminatory purpose but must prove that such a purpose was a
motivating factor for the action.7 5 The Court then explained that
the determination of whether discriminatory purpose was a moti-
vating factor requires an inquiry into such circumstances and di-
rect evidence of intent as may be available, and identified a
nonexhaustive list of evidentiary sources of intent: historical
background of the allegedly discriminatory decision, specific se-
quence of events leading up to the decision and departure from
normal procedural sequence, and legislative or administrative his-
tory and debates.7 6
However, as in Washington v. Davis, the Court in Arlington
Heights again stated that proof of disproportionate racial impact
by itself generally will not support a claim of race discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause.77 It did indicate that
disproportionate impact is not totally irrelevant and can be a
starting point for further inquiry into evidence of intent.78 The
Court noted that in some cases the discriminatory effect of
facially neutral legislation or practices may present a clear pat-
tern unexplainable on grounds other than race.7 9 However, the
Court quickly qualified this statement by adding that only in rare
cases of egregiously disproportionate impact-in which the only
possible explanation is race discrimination-will impact alone be
determinative of intent to discriminate.8 0
Thus, although proof of disproportionate adverse impact is not
totally irrelevant under the Supreme Court's recent definition of
the "intent" standard for constitutional claims, it will not nor-
73. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. 429 U.S. at 265-66.
76. Id. at 266-68.
77. Id. at 265.
78. Id. at 265-66.
79. Id.
80. Id. In so stating, the Court singled out Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), as examples of such rare
cases.
mally be enough to support a plaintiff's prima facie case. Further
refinement of this standard may uncover new evidentiary sources
that will make it easier for plaintiffs to prove intent.81 But under
present interpretations, many civil rights plaintiffs will be unable
to establish the requisite intent when challenging facially race-
neutral conduct, policies, or practices.
A hypothetical example may help illustrate the significance of
the distinction between the "impact" and "intent" standards. As-
sume that a large company has a policy of not employing any per-
sons with arrest records. This policy has been in effect for as long
as the company has been in existence, and it is fairly applied to
both black and white applicants. The arrest record policy is chal-
lenged by otherwise qualified black applicants who have been re-
jected as a result of its operation. These plaintiffs can offer no
proof that the policy involves intentional race discrimination, but
they can prove statistically that the policy operates to disqualify
fifteen percent of the black applicants, compared with only four
percent of the white applicants. In addition, based on appropriate
census and crime statistics, they can demonstrate that a black
person is three to four times as likely as a white person to have
an arrest record.
Under the Griggs "effects" standard, this statistical evidence
would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case, shifting the
burden to the defendant company to show that its arrest record
81. A number of lower courts have already construed the purposeful discrimi-
nation requirement of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights and have set
forth some additional guidelines as to what may constitute evidence of intent. See,
e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 410-15 (7th Cir. 1978);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 140-47 (2d Cir. 1978); Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp.
1025 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.
Pa. 1977). These decisions indicate that evidence of disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant but provides a starting point for further evidence of intent. They also
indicate that a presumption of discriminatory purpose may arise where the mate-
rial, probable, and foreseeable effects of a defendant's conduct is discrimination.
Some decisions have noted that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of in-
tentional discrimination by showing that in adopting a course of action the defen-
dant ignored less discriminatory options that would have furthered the
defendant's policies as effectively as the option chosen. See United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1978). Other decisions have indi-
cated approval of the "rule of exclusion" means of proving a prima facie case, set
forth in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). See Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ohio 1978). These decisions provide methods of proving inten-
tional race discrimination by objective evidence of intent and thus eliminate some
of the proof problems inherent in proving subjective intent to discriminate. For a
thoughtful discussion of examples of what may constitute evidence of intentional
race discrimination in disproportionate impact cases, see Simon, Racially
Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1107-27 (1978).
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policy is justified.82 Under the "intent" standard, the plaintiffs' ev-
idence would not be sufficient to establish a prima facie case: The
disparate effect of the policy is not egregious, and there is no
other evidence of racially discriminatory intent or purpose. In-
stead, the plaintiffs' claim of race discrimination would fail. Like-
wise, any other facially neutral policy with a similar adverse
impact, such as a high school diploma requirement, would not be
readily challengeable under the "intent" standard. No matter
how arbitrary such policies and practices were in design, the de-
fendant would not be required to justify them.
Thus, as the arrest record hypothetical illustrates, the differ-
ence between the "intent" standard and the "impact" standard is
substantial for civil rights litigants. Because of the covert nature
of modern race discrimination and of the widespread reliance on
facially neutral policies and practices, proof of intentional dis-
crimination is not easily established. Such proof is certainly
much more difficult to show than evidence of impact or effect.
Having defined the two standards, it is necessary to examine how
they have been, and are being, applied with respect to section
1981.
IV. INTENT V. IMPACT: CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE IN THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Despite the importance of determining whether the standard of
proof under section 1981 should be one that requires a showing of
discriminatory intent or one that requires merely a showing of
disproportionate impact, until recently the lower federal courts
have made the choice with little discussion or analysis. Prior to
the decision in Washington v. Davis,83 nearly every court that had
considered the issue had held that the standard of proof under
section 1981 was the same as that under title VII and thus that a
plaintiff need only prove racially discriminatory effect to make out
a prima facie case.84 To understand how this adoption of the "im-
82. In fact, several courts have found that such arrest record policies do vio-
late Title VII. See cases cited note 63 supra.
83. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
84. Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975); Kirk-
land v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975);
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725
(lst Cir. 1972). See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wiscon-
pact" standard for section 1981 evolved, it is necessary to return
again to the area of employment discrimination and title VII.
After the decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.85 extended
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to reach private discrimination, sec-
tion 1981 immediately was used by civil rights plaintiffs as an ad-
junct to claims based on the 1964 or the 1968 Civil Rights Acts.
Because most of these claims were employment discrimination
cases under title VII, section 1981 received its most extensive ini-
tial use in that area. However, because of the previously dis-
cussed uncertainties surrounding the relationship between
section 1981 and title VII, few cases relied solely on section 1981.86
In fact, section 1981 was viewed primarily as an additional claim
to be pressed only if something went wrong with the title VII
claim. 87 So although plaintiffs alleged section 1981 along with title
VII violations in hundreds of employment discrimination cases,
courts rarely gave section 1981 any independent consideration.
As a result of this tie-in between title VII and section 1981,
courts often construed the two statutes alike. When the Supreme
Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.88 and thereby adopted
the "effects" test, the lower courts were faced with a tremendous
upsurge of title VII complaints challenging practices solely on the
basis of disparate impact. As it was prior to Griggs, plaintiffs con-
tinued to plead section 1981 as a secondary claim. Likewise, with-
out independent analysis, courts continued to construe the
standard of proof necessary for a prima facie case under section
1981 the same as that required for title VII. Because of the im-
portance of the Griggs ruling for employment discrimination
cases, the lower courts automatically applied the Griggs "effects"
standard even when plaintiffs asserted only section 1981.89
sin Steel Workers, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976);
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dye-
ing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
85. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
86. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
87. See Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy'" The Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 So. CAlL. REV. 961
(1977).
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. See cases cited note 84 supra. Title VII was not applicable to state or fed-
eral employers until amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). Prior to
those amendments, plaintiffs often alleged § 1981 as the basis of employment dis.
crimination claims against such public employers in addition to § 1983, the fifth
amendment, and the fourteenth amendment. Courts treated claims based on
§ 1981, as well as claims based on § 1983 and on the Constitution, as though they
were title VII claims.
Prior to Washington v. Davis, nearly every court that had considered the issue
had ruled that under § 1983, as well as under the fifth or fourteenth amendments, a
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This evolving relationship helps explain why, prior to the 1976
decision in Washington v. Davis, almost every circuit had held,
often with little or no discussion, that under section 1981 a plain-
tiff need only prove racially discriminatory effect to make out a
prima facie case and that lack of discriminatory intent was irrele-
vant.90 Likewise, the lower federal courts generally held that the
title VII "effects" standard was applicable to claims brought pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the fifth amendment, or the fourteenth
amendment.91
After the Supreme Court's holdings in Washington v. Davis and
in Arlington Heights, the lower courts reconsidered the issue of
the appropriate standard under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments and, in addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.92 Understandably,
every lower court that has reconsidered the question of the ap-
propriate standard for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has held that a plaintiff
must prove intentional discrimination and that a mere showing of
disproportionate impact generally is not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination.93 However, the lower
courts have not read Washington v. Davis as requiring proof of in-
plaintiff need show only disproportionate adverse racial impact to prove a prima
facie case of unlawful employment discrimination. See, e.g., Boston Chapter
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1974);
Vulcan Soc'y of the New York Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
Title VII standards were so influential in the area of employment discrimination
that courts even adopted the "business necessity" test and approved use of the
EEOC guidelines in non-title VII cases. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975). This situation, of course,
changed when the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis and expressly
held that the strict "business necessity" test and the EEOC guidelines were appli-
cable only to title VII cases, not to claims based on the Constitution. 426 U.S. at
248-52.
90. See cases cited note 84 supra.
91. See note 89 supra. In addition, several cases have held that the "effects"
standard applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1982. E.g., Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231
(8th Cir. 1976). Contra, Boyd v. Lefrak Org'n, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to, and authorizes suits under, the four-
teenth amendment. See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
93. E.g., Chavez v. Temple Union High School, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977);
Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081
(8th Cir. 1977); Butler v. Cooper, 554 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1977); Chicano Police Of-
ficer's Ass'n v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Chi-
cago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir.
1976); Acha v. Beame, 438 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Santiago v. City of Philadel-
phia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
tent in title VII cases.94
Although the actual rulings in Washington v. Davis and in Ar-
lington Heights dealt with the standard of proof only under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, respectively, these rulings have
also now caused the lower courts to reassess their positions on
the appropriate standard for section 1981.95 In so doing, courts in
different circuits have reached different conclusions. As of the
date of this article, at least two courts of appeals and a few dis-
trict courts had held that even after Washington v. Davis a plain-
tiff need prove only discriminatory effect or impact to establish a
prima facie case under section 1981.96 On the other hand, at least
94. Although Washington v. Davis was not a title VII case, see 426 U.S. at 238-
39, 249-52, a number of lower courts have found it necessary to rule explicitly that
the decision in no manner affected the Griggs "effects" standard in cases brought
under title VII. E.g., Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Health, 561 F.2d 489
(3d Cir. 1977); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1977); Fire Fighters Inst. Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977)1
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
However, the rulings in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights have re-
sulted in a question of potentially broad significance regarding the 1972 amend-
ments to title VII. These amendments extended title VII's coverage to state and
local government employers. See note 89 supra. In enacting these amendments, it
appears that Congress was exercising its powers under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). If this source is the sole
constitutional basis for the 1972 amendments, claims against state and local gov-
ernments under these amendments may require proof of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. The Supreme Court is aware of this issue but has not fully consid-
ered or ruled on it. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12
(1977). At least three district courts have held that a showing of intentional dis-
crimination is required in such claims. Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361 (E.D.
Va. 1977); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 55 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Scott v.
City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 515 (N.D. Ala. 1977). Contra, United States v.
City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
One answer to this question is to recognize that Congress also enacted the 1972
title VII amendments pursuant to its commerce clause powers, as it did in enact-
ing the 1964 Act. However, this position raises serious questions as to whether
these amendments, which seek to regulate the employment decisions of state and
local governments, are properly within the power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The
better argument would seem to be that although the equal protection clause re-
quires proof of intent, Congress nonetheless has the power under § 5 of the four-
teenth amendment to enact legislation that adopts an impact standard. See
United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
95. Ironically, just as Griggs, a title VII case, influenced the lower courts to
adopt an impact standard in employment discrimination cases involving § 1981,
Washington v. Davis, a constitutional ruling in another employment discrimination
case, has influenced the lower courts to reconsider their § 1981 holdings. In both
instances, the fact that the decisions were employment discrimination cases has
had a greater effect on § 1981 than the actual holdings warranted. It should, how-
ever, be pointed out that § 1981 was plead in Washington v. Davis. As discussed in
pt. V infra, some confusion exists as to whether the decision has, by implication,
already ruled on the issue of the appropriate standard for § 1981.
96. Cases requiring only a showing of racially discriminatory effect include
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
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three other courts of appeals and a growing number of district
courts have held that a showing of disproportionate impact, by it-
self, is not sufficient and that the plaintiff must prove intentional
or purposeful discrimination to establish a prima facie case under
section 1981.97
Only a few of these recent cases have engaged in any compre-
hensive analysis in determining which standard of proof is re-
quired for claims based on section 1981.98 Undoubtedly, this is
because there are no clearly dispositive arguments for or against
either standard. In the section that follows, the arguments for
and against each standard will be identified and analyzed, begin-
ning with the arguments concerning whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis has already impliedly
ruled on the standard-of-proof issue for section 1981.
3087 (1978); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133, 140 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Woods v. City of
Saginaw, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1796 (E.D. Mich. 1976); League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Aria, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 344 n.51 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramos v.
Texas Tech Univ., 441 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (N.D. Tex. 1977), afid, 566 F.2d 573 (5th
Cir. 1978). See also Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); Johnson v. Perini Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6808 (D.D.C. 1977); Neely
v. City of Grenada, 438 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
97. Cases holding that the plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful dis-
crimination to establish a prima facie case under § 1981 include Williams v.
DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693,
705 (7th Cir. 1976); Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Ortiz
v. Back, 448 F. Supp. 953 (D. Colo. 1977); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 728
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977);
Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Scott v. City of An-
niston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park,
429 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (§ 1982); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respira-
tory Therapy, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6878 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F.
Supp. 490 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affid sub nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 579 (1978). See also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 140-43 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1458 (1978); Richardson v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 1977); Wiley v. Memphis
Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1254 (6th Cir. 1977); Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F.
Supp. 135, 145 nA (N.D. IlM. 1977).
98. The most extensive discussions of this issue are contained in opinions that
have concluded that a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination under § 1981.
E.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1347-51 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
440 F. Supp. 949, 963-66 (D. Md. 1977).
V. INTENT V. IMPACT: THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EACH
STANDARD FOR SECTION 1981
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis99 evidently neither con-
sidered nor decided the appropriate standard of proof for a prima
facie case under section 1981. The most accurate reading of the
Court's opinion is that the Court decided only the constitutional
standard under the fifth amendment. To facilitate understanding
of the Court's opinion, it is first necessary to examine the proce-
dural history of the case.
In challenging the defendant police department's promotion
and recruitment practices, the plaintiffs did allege that the prac-
tices violated section 1981, as well as the fifth amendment and
section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code.0o However, the
plaintiffs never pursued these statutory grounds. Instead, they
filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the
validity of the challenged personnel test (Test 21) based solely on
their fifth amendment claim.' 0 ' In support of this motion, the
plaintiffs presented evidence which showed that the challenged
test excluded a disproportionately high number of black appli-
cants. 0 2 The defendants also filed motions for summary judg-
ment, asserting that even if Test 21 had a disparate racial impact,
the plaintiffs were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor
statutory grounds because the test was sufficiefitly related to po-
lice training performance. 0 3 The district court found that the test
had a racially discriminatory impact but that it was validated in
terms of police training.O4 Accordingly, the district court denied
the plaintiffs' motion and granted those of the defendants.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's rulings, hold-
ing that the district court should have followed the title VII stand-
ards set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.10 5 to decide the
plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim. 0 6 The court of appeals found
the test unconstitutional because it had a disproportionately ad-
verse racial impact and had not been proven to be an accurate
measure of job performance in addition to being an indicator of
99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
100. Id. at 233.
101. Id. at 234.
102. Id. at 233-36.
103. Id. at 234.
104. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
105. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
106. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This decision is
summarized in the Supreme Court's opinion, 426 U.S. at 236-37.
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probable success in the police training program. 01 Apparently,
the defendants did not contest application of the "impact" stan-
dard to the plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim but questioned the
adequacy of the plaintiffs' statistical showing and contended that
the test need be validated only by a demonstrated relationship to
training program success.108
Thus when the case reached the Supreme Court, the only is-
sues presented to and ruled on by the lower courts concerned the
appropriate standard of proof under the fifth amendment and the
adequacy of the test's validation with respect to the fifth amend-
ment and the asserted statutes. The lower courts neither consid-
ered nor ruled on the appropriate standard of proof for a prima
facie case under section 1981.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove intentional discrimination and
that the defendants had adequately validated their test. In part I
of its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth the procedural history
of the case.109 In part II of its opinion, the Court discussed only
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment." 0 With respect to
this motion, the Court held that it was error for the court of ap-
peals to apply the title VII standards in resolving a constitutional
issue. 1 ' Under an equal protection analysis, the Court ruled that
a facially neutral practice is generally not unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially discriminatory impact.n 2 After reviewing
several equal protection cases, the Court concluded that to estab-
lish a constitutionally based prima facie claim of race discrimina-
tion, the plaintiffs must prove that the test involved purposeful or
intentional discrimination."3
An analysis of part II of the Supreme Court's opinion shows
that the Court discussed and decided the appropriate standard of
proof only for claims based on the fifth amendment or on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
went to great lengths to state explicitly that it dealt only with the
fifth amendment claim raised in the plaintiffs' motion for sum-
107. 512 F.2d at 961-65. See 426 U.S. at 237.
108. 512 F.2d at 960-63.
109. 426 U.S. at 232-38.
110. Id. at 238-48.
111. Id. at 238.
112. Id. at 239.
113. Id. at 245-48.
mary judgment. It repeatedly pointed out that the plaintiffs' mo-
tion presented no issues under any statutes or regulations.114
Moreover, throughout its discussion of the standard of proof nec-
essary to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, the
Court repeatedly stated that it was dealing with "constitutional"
issues and rules.115 Thus the Court did not rule on the section
1981 standard when, in part II of its opinion, it held that proof of
intentional or purposeful discrimination is required for constitu-
tionally based claims.116
However, the discussion in part III of the Court's opinion is
more troublesome. There, the Court considered the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to relief on either constitutional or statutory
grounds.117 The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
was in error in requiring that the defendants' Test 21 could be val-
idated only by showing that it was related to job performance, be-
cause that was a title VII requirement. Instead, the Court held
that the defendants had shown the test to be validated by their
evidence of a positive relationship between the test and training-
course performance.1 8 Thus the Court in effect ruled that the ti-
tle VII requirement of job-relatedness validation does not apply to
non-title VII employment discrimination cases whether based on
constitutional or statutory grounds."19
Just as it is clear that part 11 of the opinion, concerning the
plaintiffs' standard of proof for a prima facie case, involves only
constitutional claims, it is clear that part MI, concerning what the
defendants must show to justify use of their Test 21, involves both
constitutional and statutory grounds. Although the Court in ppart
II never identified the statutes it considered, the only statutory
grounds plead by the plaintiffs were section 1981 and section 1-320
114. Id. at 234, 238 n.10. The Court also explicitly distinguished and contrasted
its constitutional analysis from that necessary under title VII. Id. at 239, 246-47.
115. In pt. I of the opinion, the Court repeatedly used language to leave no
doubt that it was dealing only with a "constitutional issue," a "constitutional stan-
dard," a "constitutional rule," and a "constitutionally-based" claim. On several oc-
casions it specifically identified the constitutional amendments involved in the
decision. E.g., id. at 238, 241, 242, 246, 248.
116. Nearly all the lower court decisions construing Washington v. Davis have
viewed it as directly ruling only on the standard of proof for constitutional claims,
not for claims based on § 1981. See cases cited notes 96-97 supra. See also The
Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HAv. L. REv. 56, 114-23 (1976). This is true even for
many of the cases that eventually concluded that a plaintiff must prove intentional
discrimination for claims under § 1981. E.g., Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.
Supp. 949, 963 (D. Md. 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
117. 426 U.S. at 248-52.
118. Id. at 250.
119. See The Supreme Cour4 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L REV. 56, 121-23 (1976).
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of the District of Columbia Code.120
The discussion of the defendants' burden in part III of the opin-
ion supports an argument regarding the standard of proof re-
quired for a prima facie case under section 1981. The Court had
already ruled in part II that plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove
a prima facie case under the fifth amendment. Accordingly, be-
cause the burden of justification never shifted to the defendants
on this constitutional claim, there was no reason for the Court to
consider whether the defendants had adequately validated Test
21 in accordance with fifth amendment requirements. That the
Court did consider the adequacy of the defendants' evidence re-
garding the validity of the test in relation to the plaintiffs' statu-
tory claims could indicate that the Court must have viewed the
plaintiffs as having presented a prima facie case of race discrimi-
nation under section 1981 and/or D.C. Code § 1-320. For unless
the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case with respect to
these statutory claims, there would have been no reason for the
burden to shift to the defendants to prove the test's validity and
no reason for the Court to discuss the defendants' validation evi-
dence in part I of the opinion. Because the only evidence before
the Court was that the facially neutral Test 21 had a dispropor-
tionately adverse racial impact, it can be argued that the Court
must have implicitly held that under section 1981 (and/or D.C.
Code § 1-320), unlike the fifth amendment, the plaintiffs need
prove only disproportionate impact to establish a prima facie
case.
Despite the above argument, it does not appear that the Court
did indeed implicitly determine the standard of proof for section
1981. Nowhere in part I of its opinion does the Court explain its
reasons for discussing the defendants' proffered justifications for
Test 21.121 However, from the procedural history of the case, it
appears that the defendants in their summary judgment motions
assumed that title VII standards governed the statutory issues. It
further appears that the defendants assumed, at least for pur-
120. 426 U.S. at 233. Although § 1981 was never specifically identified in pt. III of
the majority opinion, Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion interpreted pt. MI
as ruling on both § 1981 and D.C. Code § 1-320. Id. at 255.
121. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens merely indicates that the statu-
tory grounds cannot be ignored because the court of appeals set aside that portion
of the district court's order granting the defendants' motions. Id. In contrast, the
dissent reasons that the majority should not have reached the statutory claims.
Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
poses of their motions, that the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case by proof of disparate impact.122 Likewise, the Court ap-
propriately assumed, for purposes of deciding the defendants'
summary judgment motions, that the burden had shifted to the
defendants to prove the validity of Test 21 with respect to the
plaintiffs' statutory claims.123 Thus it does not appear that the
Court, by considering the question of whether the defendants had
demonstrated sufficient justification for the use of Test 21, implic-
itly ruled that the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case
under section 1981 merely by proving disproportionate racial im-
pact. Moreover, although the net effect of the Court's analysis in
parts 11 and JI with respect to the standard of proof for section
1981 is not totally free from doubt, it is unlikely that the Court
would have left so important an issue to decision by implication.
But if Washington v. Davis did not directly rule on the issue of
the appropriate standard of proof for section 1981 claims, the next
question to be considered is whether there is any reason for not
automatically extending its holding to section 1981. After Wash-
ington v. Davis and Arlington Heights124 there is no question that
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require proof of intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination. 2 5 Is there any reason that these holdings
should not likewise automatically extend to section 1981? The an-
swer lies in the different constitutional bases for these two early
civil rights statutes.
The sole constitutional basis for section 1983 is the fourteenth
amendment. 26 One of the primary purposes of section 1983 is to
authorize a statutory cause of action for violations of that amend-
ment. Accordingly, because the holdings in Washington v. Davis
and Arlington Heights were directed at claims of race discrimina-
122. In fact, the defendants did not contest the applicability of the Griggs and
the title VII standards to the case. They did not even raise them as an issue in
their petition for certiorari. Id. at 238 & n.8. The Supreme Court raised the issue
pursuant to its Rule 40(1) (d) (2) as "a plain error not presented." Id. See text ac-
companying note 103 supra.
123. In light of the procedural history of the case, this assumption does not
seem inappropriate. See note 122 supra. Undoubtedly, the Court saw no need to
review the standard-of-proof issue for the statutory claims because it could dis-
pose of the defendants' summary judgment motions by finding sufficient evidence
of the test's validation.
124. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
125. See cases cited note 93 supra.
126. Section 1983 originated in § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13. The primary purpose of the 1871 Act was "to enforce the Provisions of the
fourteenth amendment." Id. Unlike the thirteenth amendment, the fourteenth
amendment applies only to state action or to those acting under color of state law.
See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a discussion of the purpose
and history of § 1983, see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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tion under the fourteenth amendment, that these holdings should
automatically be applied to section 1983 is not surprising.
Unlike section 1983, section 1981 originally was enacted pursu-
ant to section 2 of the thirteenth amendment to give force and ef-
fect to that amendment. 2 7 Because section 1981 is based
primarily on the thirteenth amendment, it applies to purely pri-
vate conduct; section 1983, with its fourteenth amendment basis,
applies only to state action. 128 Just as this difference in constitu-
tional origins is determinative of the state action issue, it may
also be determinative of the standard-of-proof issue.12 9 Even if
not determinative, the fact that section 1981 is based on the thir-
teenth amendment is at least a sufficient reason for not
automatically extending the fourteenth amendment standards of
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights to section 1981.130
That the primary constitutional basis for section 1981 is the thir-
teenth amendment, not the fourteenth amendment, is significant
but not necessarily dispositive of the standard-of-proof issue. Al-
though the Supreme Court has ruled on the fourteenth amend-
ment standard of proof, it has never determined the standard of
proof required to make out a prima facie case of race discrimina-
tion under the thirteenth amendment. It is therefore necessary to
127. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968). See discussion in pt. II supra. There is, however, some confusion
as to whether § 1981 is partially based on the fourteenth amendment. The confu-
sion stems from the fact that § 1 of the 1866 Act was reenacted by the 1870 Act, a
fourteenth amendment statute. See Note, Towards an Integrated Society-The
New Section 1981, 1976 Aimz. ST. L.J. 549. See also note 19 supra. However, despite
its arguably dual constitutional basis, § 1981 is considered to be primarily a thir-
teenth amendment statute. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8; Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409.
128. See note 126 supra.
129. This difference in the constitutional bases may also be significant in con-
struing the language of the two statutes. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418 (1973).
130. It can be argued, however, that the holdings in Washington v. Davis and in
Arlington Heights are not limited to the fifth and fourteenth amendments because
the opinions talk generally in terms of requiring proof of intentional discrimina-
tion for "constitutionally-based claims," see note 115 supra, and thus that the
Court was setting forth a constitutional as opposed to a statutory rule. See Clark,
Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 953 (1978). But this argument proves too much. It indicates merely
that an impact standard may be permissible for statutory claims even though in-
appropriate for constitutional claims. In fact, the Court in Washington v. Davis ex-
plicitly reaffirmed the "effects" test for title VII cases. 426 U.S. at 246-47.
examine the thirteenth amendment before continuing with the
analysis of section 1981.
Section 1 of the thirteenth amendment does not speak of race
discrimination per se; it prohibits slavery and involuntary servi-
tude.131 Section 2 of the thirteenth amendment,132 the enabling
clause, broadly empowers Congress to enforce the amendment by
appropriate legislation. Since its initial construction by the
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases,133 the Court has viewed
the enabling clause as clothing "Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery." 34 The Court also interpreted the enabling clause as
authorizing Congress to adopt direct and specific legislation nec-
essary "to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be af-
fected by the [thirteenth amendment], and to prescribe proper
modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit."135 More re-
cently, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court has again
broadly stated that under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment
Congress has the power '"rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation." 136
As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jones and in the Civil
Rights Cases, the language and purposes of the thirteenth amend-
ment are broad enough to authorize Congress to enact legislation
that would prohibit conduct having the effect, though not the in-
tent or purpose, of perpetuating the "badges and incidents" of
slavery. Likewise, the language and purposes seem broad enough
131. Section 1 of the thirteenth amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction."
132. Section 2 of the thirteenth amendment provides: "Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
133. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
134. Id. at 20; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
135. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Ironically, although the
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases broadly defined the power of Congress
under the enabling clause to abolish all "badges and incidents" of slavery, it nar-
rowly defined these "badges and incidents" so as to exclude race discrimination in
most contexts, such as in public accommodations, conveyances, and theaters. Id.
at 20-25. This narrow definition of the "badges and incidents" of slavery was, of
course, rejected in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968). See
pt. II supra.
136. 392 U.S. at 440. In ruling that the thirteenth amendment authorizes § 1982,
the Court made several other broad statements about the power of Congress
under the enabling clause. Stating that when racial discrimination herds men into
ghettos it is a relic of slavery, the Court viewed congressional power as broad
enough to eradicate conditions and barriers that prevent blacks from buying or
renting property and to assure "that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase
the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man." Id. at 443.
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to authorize legislation that would provide for a claim based
solely on a showing of racially discriminatory impact or effect re-
gardless of discriminatory intent or motivation.137 However, that
the thirteenth amendment appears to empower Congress to enact
legislation aimed at racially discriminatory effect or dispropor-
tionate impact regardless of intent does not necessarily mean that
section 1981 is such a statute.138 To make this determination it is
necessary to examine the language and the legislative history of
section 1981.139
Section 1981 is worded like an equal protection statute. It guar-
antees that all persons "shall have the same right" to make and to
enforce contracts, to sue, to give evidence, and to the "full and
equal benefit" of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property "as is enjoyed by white citizens."' 40 Because
the language indicates that black persons shall have the same
right to contract and to the equal benefit of all laws as whites, one
can conclude that all section 1981 guarantees is, for example in
the context of employment discrimination, that whatever employ-
ment policies are applied to blacks be likewise applied to whites.
Thus in the arrest record hypothetical, as long as the employer
137. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D. Md.
1977). Even if the Court requires proof of intentional discrimination for claims
proceeding directly under § 1 of the thirteenth amendment, it seems reasonably
clear that Congress is empowered by the broad grant of authority in § 2 to adopt
legislation that permits a prima facie case to be established by a showing of dis-
proportionate racial impact. Courts have construed similar broad enabling lan-
guage in § 5 of the fourteenth amendment as empowering Congress to adopt
legislation prohibiting conduct even though such conduct had been previously de-
termined not to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-51 (1966); United States v. City of Chicago,
573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
138. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), in which the Court up-
held the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), relying on the thirteenth amend-
ment. After reviewing the language and the legislative history of this anti-
conspiracy statute, the Court concluded that to make out a claim, a plaintiff must
prove that the conspirators acted with an invidiously discriminatory racial animus.
139. An argument can be made, however, that if the thirteenth amendment is
broad enough to authorize legislation that permits a prima facie case based only
on disproportionate racial impact, there is no reason to view § 1981 less broadly
than the thirteenth amendment. This argument carries some weight if an impact
standard is appropriate for claims based on § 1 of the thirteenth amendment.
However, if an impact standard is appropriate only because Congress is empow-
ered to authorize its use by legislation adopted pursuant to § 2, use of an impact
standard is appropriate only if it is consistent with the legislative purpose and lan-
guage of § 1981. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
140. For the full text of §§ 1981 & 1982, see note 14 supra.
fairly applied the arrest record policy to both black and white ap-
plicants, the policy would not violate section 1981. This reading of
the language of section 1981 would not permit a prima facie case
to be based solely on disproportionate impact if the challenged
practice were facially neutral and applied to blacks and whites
alike.141
However, the langugage of section 1981, standing alone, is sim-
ply not that clear. It can certainly be argued that it also supports
application of the "impact" standard. For if a practice has a
significant adverse racial impact, then regardless of intent it has
the effect of preventing blacks from enjoying the same and equal
rights to contract as are enjoyed by whites.142 Thus the language
of section 1981, by itself, is susceptible to two plausible interpreta-
tions with respect to the question of whether the "intent" or the
"impact" standard applies. But when compared to the language
of other civil rights statutes, the language of section 1981 does
lend some support to the argument that intentional discrimina-
tion must be shown.
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c) is authorized by the enabling clause of the thir-
teenth amendment and thus extends to purely private conduct.143
Section 1985(c)144 provides civil remedies for conspiracies that
are entered into "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws." In construing this language, the Court held that the word
"equal" in this context requires that for conspirators' conduct to
be actionable, there must be some racially discriminatory animus
or motivation behind it.145 Thus use of the word "equal" in sec-
tion 1985(c), even though appearing in a thirteenth amendment
statute, indicates that a showing of discriminatory motive is nec-
141. A number of lower courts have simply compared the equal protection lan-
guage of § 1981 to that of the fourteenth amendment and have concluded that they
should apply the same standard of proving discrimination to both. E.g., Lewis v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D. Md. 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co.,
437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490,
494 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affrd sub nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 579 (1978). In addition to being overly simplistic, this ap-
proach ignores the fact that even identical language in separate statutes can lead
to opposite interpretations when the constitutional basis of each statute is differ-
ent. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
142. General statements in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
support this interpretation of the language of § 1981. See note 136 supra.
143. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). See note 139 supra.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976), previously § 1985(3), was first enacted as § 2 of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1971, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
145. 403 U.S. at 102 & nn.9 & 10.
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essary. And although the language of section 1985(c) is not com-
pletely analogous to that of section 1981, the Griffin Court's
interpretation of the language of section 1985(c) lends some sup-
port to the argument that section 1981 requires a showing of in-
tentional discrimination.146
Further support for requiring the "intent" standard for section
1981 comes from statements in the Supreme Court's analysis of
section 1982 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.147 Forty-two U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982 both originate from section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,148 and their operative language is almost identical.
Like section 1981, section 1982 guarantees that all citizens shall
have "the same right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens" to in-
herit, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.149
In analyzing the language and legislative history of section 1982 to
determine whether section 1982 reaches private conduct, the
Jones Court twice stated that Congress intended section 1 of the
1866 Act to prohibit all "racially motivated" deprivations of rights
enumerated in the Act.150 These statements are unquestionably
dicta. The issue of the standard of proof required for a prima fa-
cie case under section 1982 was not before the Court in Jones; ap-
pellants presented only the issue of whether section 1982 applies
to purely private conduct. However, these statements are at least
some expression of the Court's view of the statute, a view that
146. The support that Griffin lends to requiring a showing of intent under § 1981
is, however, not substantial. Although the Court focused on the word "equal" in
§ 1985(c), its analysis was also influenced by other language and the legislative
history of that statute. Section 1985(c) requires as an element of the claim that
the conspiracy be "for the purpose of depriving" persons of equal protection.
Some finding of intent or motivation is clearly required by use of the word "Pur-
pose." Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a conspiracy as being actionable which
only has the impact, but not the intent, of denying equal rights.
Moreover, the Court in extending § 1985(c) to private conspiracies was con-
cerned that it would be turning the statute into a general federal tort law. Id. at
100-02. Accordingly, the Court examined the legislative history of the 1871 Act not
only to determine whether it applied to private conduct but also to determine
whether the congressional purpose was to require racially discriminatory motive
as an element of the claim. And unlike the legislative history of § 1981, the legisla-
tive history of § 1985(c) clearly and explicitly centers on the question of the need
for proof of racially discriminatory animus. Id. Thus even though the Court in
Griffin did focus on the equal protection language of § 1985(c), it is somewhat in-
accurate to conclude that the mere presence of such language in § 1985(c) caused
the Court to require proof of racially discriminatory intent or motive.
147. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
148. See discussion in pt. 11 supra.
149. The complete texts of §§ 1981 & 1982 are set forth in note 14 supra.
150. 392 U.S. at 421, 426.
supports the argument for an "intent" standard under section
1981.151
A final argument with respect to the language of section 1981 in-
volves a comparison of section 1981 to the operative language of
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.152 Title VII prohibits and
provides remedies for unlawful employment practices, defined in
section 703 of the 1964 Act. Section 703(a) (2) defines an "unlawful
employment practice" as one by which the employer limits, segre-
gates, or classifies his employees or applicants for employment
"in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive" individuals
of employment opportunities or would "otherwise adversely af-
fect" their status as employees because of their race or color.153
Although this quoted language does not explicitly adopt an im-
pact standard, it does show that Congress was concerned with the
effects of discriminatory employment practices.154 When com-
pared to section 1981, the language of section 703(a) (2) more
clearly indicates the appropriateness of an impact standard than
does the equal protection language of the earlier statute.155
151. Some lower courts have relied on this dicta in Jones as part of their expla-
nation for requiring proof of intentional discrimination in § 1981 claims. E.g., Davis
v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1977); (Wallace, J., dis-
senting), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.
Supp. 949, 964-65 (D. Md. 1977).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a) (1976) provides in full:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
154. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), held that a violation of
§ 703(a) (2) can be established by proof of discriminatory effect. The Court has not
yet decided whether proof of intent is necessary to establish a prima facie viola-
tion of § 703(a) (1). See Nashville Gas. Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
155. The language of §§ 703(a) (2) & 1981 should also be contrasted with that of
§ 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(h) (1976). Section 703(h) provides that notvithstand-
ing any other provision of title VII, it shall not be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system, "provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race." Based on this language, the Supreme Court has held
that absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot
be an unlawful employment practice even if it has some discriminatory conse-
quences. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977). That
§ 703(h) is an exception to the rest of title VII and explicitly requires intentional
discrimination further supports the use of an "impact" standard under § 703(a) (2).
The explicit language requiring proof of intent in § 703(h) also can be contrasted
[voL. 16: 207, 19791 Standard of Proof
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Thus, although the language of section 1981 conclusively re-
quires neither standard, when compared to the other civil rights
statutes construed by the Supreme Court it does support the ar-
gument that a prima facie violation generally cannot be estab-
lished by a mere showing of disproportionate impact. However,
because the section's language is not decisive of this issue, it is
necessary to examine the congressional purpose and the legisla-
tive history of section 1981.
Analysis of the legislative history of the 1866 Act sheds some
light on the "intent v. impact" question, but again, as with the lan-
guage analysis, ultimately it is inconclusive. The congressional
debates show that Congress enacted the 1866 Act, particularly
section 1, to give practical meaning to the thirteenth amend-
ment. 5 6 Even before the thirteenth amendment was officially rat-
ified in December, 1865, most of the Reconstruction States had
enacted legislation that explicitly denied the recently freed blacks
(Ifreedmen") several fundamental civil rights. These state stat-
utes, known as "Black Codes," typically prevented blacks from
owning or renting certain types of property, engaging in certain
types of employment, marrying whites, or testifying against
whites. In some instances they even levied special taxes on
freedmen.157 These Black Codes were not race-neutral but made
facially invidious distinctions between the rights of blacks and of
whites. 5 8
In the congressional debates surrounding S. 61, the bill that
eventually would become section 1 of the 1866 Act, sponsors and
supporters repeatedly expressed outrage over the adoption and
operation of these Black Codes in the Southern States. 5 9 The
to the language of § 1981 as an indication that the language of § 1981 does not
clearly require proof of intentional discrimination.
156. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1151 (remarks
of Rep. Thayer). See note 157 infra.
157. For the substance of these Black Codes, see S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 39th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1866); H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 188, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). See
also 1 W. FLE MING, DOcumENARY HISTORY OF REcONsTRucTION 273-312 (1906); E.
McPHERSON, THE PoLITIcAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING
THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29-44 (1871).
158. For example, the Mississippi Black Code expressly prohibited blacks from
owning farm land, 1865 Miss. Laws § 1. Other Codes made it illegal for blacks, but
not for whites, to keep weapons. See E. MCPHERSON, THE PoLIcAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION (1871).
159. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 474, 516-17, 602-05, 1123-25, 1151-
53, 1160, 1785 (1866).
most oppressive of these statutes, the Mississippi Black Code,
was discussed several times and viewed as typical of all the other
Codes.160 The debates show that the primary purpose of the 1866
Act was to give practical force and effect to the thirteenth amend-
ment by providing a remedy for, and a means of eliminating, the
racial discrimination of the Black Codes.161
As might be expected, at no time during the debates regarding
section 1 of the 1866 Act did Congress discuss the standard of
proof required to support a prima facie claim. It is reasonable to
assume that no member was concerned with or even aware of the
"intent v. impact" issue. However, because Congress was primar-
ily concerned with the purposeful race discrimination embodied
in the Black Codes,162 an argument can be made that the objec-
tive of Congress in enacting the 1866 Act was to prohibit inten-
tional discrimination. Moreover, at no time during the debates
was any concern expressed for eliminating the disparate impact
of facially neutral laws, practices, or conduct.163 This lack of con-
cern is understandable because at the time Congress debated the
bill, purposeful and intentional discrimination was so common-
160. See notes 157-59 supra. Seealso Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its
Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L REv. 272, 276-83
(1969).
161. The supporters of S. 61 viewed the Black Codes as circumventing the anti-
slavery provisions of the thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 602-05, 1124, 1151, 1160, 1785 (1866).
162. Although Congress was mainly concerned with elimination of the racial
discrimination of the Black Codes, the debates indicate that Congress was also
concerned with private race discrimination, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968). In addition, Congress was very concerned with whether the
recently freed slaves had acquired the legal status of citizens under the thirteenth
amendment. It therefore sought to declare them citizens under § 1 of the Act. See,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 425, 522-24, 569-75, 1115-25, 1775-81 (1866).
163. One possible exception involves references to the use of vagrancy laws in
the Reconstruction States to perpetuate the effects of slavery. E.g., CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124-25, 1151, 1833 (1866). Various vagrancy laws enacted after
the adoption of the thirteenth amendment authorized local sheriffs to arrest va-
grants, defined as persons with no lawful employment or business, and to hire
them out for little or no pay. Id.; E. MCPHERSON, POLrMCAL MANUAL FOR 1866 AND
1867, at 29-44 (1867). Congressmen were concerned about reports that because
white employers were refusing to hire blacks, blacks were being considered va-
grants and thus forced to work without pay by operation of law. Id.
It appears from the congressional debates that these vagrancy laws were facially
race-neutral but had a racially discriminatory impact when enforced. But it is also
clear that they were applied with a racially discriminatory intent and purpose.
Moreover, the vagrancy laws specifically refered to in the debates, such as those of
Mississippi, were in fact not facially race-neutral. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1883 (1866). The Mississippi vagrancy statute, adopted on November 24, 1865,
contained a § that declared unemployed freedmen to be vagrants. 1865 Miss. Laws
§ 2. Another § established a poll tax on free blacks and provided that any failure
or refusal to pay this tax would be prima facie evidence of vagrancy. The local
sheriff had the duty to hire out such vagrants to anyone who would pay the tax.
Id. §§ 6-7.
[VOL 16: 207, 19791 Standard of Proof
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
place throughout the Southern States that blacks were openly de-
nied even the most fundamental civil rights.164 Congress was
concerned with reports of the blatant and overt race discrimina-
tion that existed during the Reconstruction Era, not with the sub-
tle and covert discrimination that exists today.
Because of congressional preoccupation with intentional dis-
crimination, the congressional debates surrounding the 1866 Act
tend to support the argument that proof of intentional discrimina-
tion is required to prove a prima facie case under section 1981.
However, although the legislative history may lend some support
to the argument for an "intent" standard, it neither precludes nor
requires either standard.165 Standing alone, the legislative history
of the 1866 Act ultimately is not determinative of the "intent v. im-
pact" issue.
The legislative history of the 1866 Act by itself may be inconclu-
sive, but comparing it with the legislative history of the 1964 Act,
particularly title VII, is a little more enlightening. 66 Similar to
those of the 1866 Act, the congressional debates and reports re-
garding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not specifically discuss the
standard of proof necessary to prove a prima facie violation.167
164. Throughout the debates, proponents repeatedly characterized the 1866 Act
as necessary to ensure equality of basic civil rights for all races. E.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 504, 1152, 1293, 1832-37 (1866).
165. The legislative history of the 1866 Act cannot play a more significant role in
deciding the "intent v. impact" question because on a more abstract level of analy-
sis, it does not preclude the argument that Congress was concerned with discrimi-
natory effect as well as intent. In a general sense, the debates indicate a purpose
behind the Act of giving "practical effect, life, vigor, and enforcement" to the thir-
teenth amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. Thayer). By adopting the Act, Congress sought to abolish slavery not just in
the sense of changing the legal status of slaves but also in fact and in deed. Id. at
504, 1124, 1152. Congress did not want to pretend to give liberty and in reality have
a modified condition of slavery; it wanted to make blacks free men "in fact." Id. at
1152. Thus on a more general level of purposive analysis, it can be argued that
such general statements and purposes support the use of an '"mpact" standard for
§ 1981. The general statements regarding the purposes of the 1866 Act appearing
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), also support such an argu-
ment. See note 136 supra and note 169 infra.
166. An examination of the legislative history of title VII is relevant to the issue
because in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court viewed the leg-
islative purpose of title VII as prohibiting employment practices that are fair in
form but discriminatory in effect and therefore adopted the "effects" standard. Id.
at 430-32.
167. Although they did not discuss the issue in terms of "intent v. impact,"
some Congressmen expressed concern as to what would constitute discrimination
under the 1964 Act and whether it could be proved solely by statistical compari-
sons between the population and the employer's work force. See, e.g., H.R. Rep.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391,
2462.
However, the congressional debates and reports do emphasize
congressional concern with the effects of race discrimination;
from the extended debate regarding the use of discriminatory em-
ployment tests and the need to remove arbitrary barriers to em-
ployment, it is clear that the history of title VII supports an
"effects" standard.168 Unlike the legislative preoccupation with
overt and intentional race discrimination in the debates leading
up to passage of the 1866 Act, the legislative history of the 1964
Act generally shows that Congress was concerned with the re-
sults of more subtle and indirect race discrimination.169
On the whole, the language and legislative history of section
1981, especially when compared to that of title VII, seem to favor
the argument that a plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful
race discrimination to establish a prima facie case. But although
they support such a position, they do not clearly mandate it.170
It should be pointed out that in the legislative reports accompanying the 1972
amendments to title VII, the House report explicitly approves of the Griggs stan-
dard and the "effects" test. It states that the Act is designed to prohibit employ-
ment policies that cause a racially discriminatory effect and that are not job
related. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-25, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2155-60. Of course, no such explicit discussion or adoption
of a standard of proof appears in the legislative history of either the 1866 or the
1964 Acts.
168. For example, much concern was expressed over statistics indicating higher
unemployment and lower median income for blacks than for whites. See H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2391, 2513-16; 110 CONG. REC. 8348-49 (1964). Also, considerable debate took place
in the Senate over § 703(h) of the Act, which prohibits use of discriminatory em-
ployment tests. Although the debate centered on whether the language of the pro-
posed bill would prohibit all employment tests, a majority of the Senators sought
to prohibit use of tests that were fair in form but discriminatory in effect. See, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36 & nn.10-12 (1971); 110 CONG. REC.
5614-16, 5662, 5999-6000, 7012-13, 7247, 8447, 9024-26, 9599-9600, 13504, 13724 (1964).
169. This difference in the nature of the legislative concerns is not, however,
dispositive of the standard-of-proof issue. It is not sufficient to determine what
standard is appropriate based solely on the specific concerns of individual legisla-
tors. For in a general sense, both the 1866 Act and the 1964 Act were designed to
ensure equality of fundamental rights between the races. See note 165 supra.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court recognized in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968), that the purpose of the 1866 Act was to ensure "that a dollar in the
hands of a Negro [would] purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man." Id. at 443. The Court equated the exclusion of blacks from white
communities as nothing more than a substitute for the Black Codes and the herd-
ing of men into ghettos as a relic of slavery. Thus in this general sense, the 1866
Act as construed in Jones can be said to be concerned with discriminatory effects
as well as with motivation, just as is the 1964 Act. On this level of abstraction, the
"impact" standard can be viewed as a modern version of a method of eradicating
the more subtle "badges and incidents" of slavery now existing in society. More-
over, this general legislative purpose is not unlike that ascribed to title VII in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
170. But see Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977), in
which the court briefly examined the language and legislative history of § 1981
and, after a comparison to title VII, concluded that they require a showing of dis-
criminatory intent. Id. at 959-60, 965-66.
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The traditional modes of statutory construction-analysis of the
specific language and of the legislative history--do not provide a
conclusive answer to the "intent v. impact" question. Likewise,
attempts to decide the question based on the purposes of the 1866
Act are equally inconclusive: Depending on the degree of general-
ity used to characterize the purposes of the 1866 Act, purposive
analysis can lend support to the adoption of either standard. It is
therefore necessary to examine section 1981 in more general,
practical terms, particularly with respect to the relationship be-
tween it and title VII of the 1964 Act.
There are a number of general practical policy arguments that
can be made for and against each standard. One such argument
is that because the greatest application of section 1981 is in the
area of employment discrimination, no practical reason exists to
require a stricter standard of proof under section 1981 than under
title VI.171 This argument finds support in other contexts in
which numerous appellate courts have explicitly held that in fash-
ioning a substantive body of law under section 1981, the principles
of law judicially created under title VII should control to avoid
undesirable substantive law conflicts. 7 2 This argument does, on
the surface, seem to make good practical sense.
However, the Supreme Court has never construed section 1981
and title VII to avoid all undesirable conflicts, whether substan-
tive or procedural.173 Moreover, the same argument could be
171. At least one court in a post-Washington v. Davis decision has found this
practical argument persuasive and has adopted the impact standard for § 1981: Da-
vis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.
Ct. 3087 (1978). This argument is based on the Supreme Court's view that title VII
and § 1981 are "parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination." Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 & n.7 (1973).
172. The cases that have construed § 1981 to avoid substantive law conflicts
with title VII have usually been cases in which the plaintiff has sought to assert
claims or to obtain relief not available under title VII. E.g., Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 997 (1976). Many of these cases involved challenges to seniority plans
under § 1981 that were foreclosed under title VII by the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See note
34 supra. Thus for the most part courts have used this principle of construction to
limit the substantive scope of § 1981 to that of title VII, not to make it broader.
E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
173. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), in which
the Court held that title VI's administrative requirements and back pay and dam-
made regarding section 1983 and title VII, yet after Washington v.
Davis and Arlington Heights, the overlapping scope of those two
statutes does not mean that they should require the same stan-
dard of proof for a prima facie case.174 As with section 1983,
merely because section 1981 and title VII apply to employment
discrimination does not mandate that they require the same stan-
dard of proof.175 In addition, section 1981 is applicable to a great
many areas that are totally different from and much broader than
employment discrimination. 176 Because of the broad substantive
reach of section 1981, it makes little sense to adopt a standard of
proof solely to avoid conflict in one area of application when that
standard will affect the statute's use in all other areas as well.
Therefore, this bootstrap argument for an "impact" standard is
not compelling.177
Another practical policy argument in favor of the "impact" stan-
dard for section 1981 is that because of the covert and subtle na-
ture of race discrimination in today's society, section 1981 would
age restrictions do not limit § 1981 and that the § 1981 statute of limitations is not
tolled pending administrative resolution of a title VII charge. See also Brown v.
General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), in which the Court held that § 717 of the
1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976), provides the exclusive remedy for employ-
ment discrimination in the federal government, preempting § 1981.
174. See discussion pt. IV supra.
175. This argument also incorrectly assumes that the "effects" standard is ap-
propriate for all §§ and applications of title VII. The "effects" test is clearly appli-
cable to claims based on § 703(a) (2) of title VII, but is clearly not appropriate for
claims against seniority plans because an "intent" standard is required by §
703(h). See notes 34 & 55 supra. Moreover, it has not been conclusively deter-
mined whether an "intent" standard is required for claims based on § 703(a) (1) or
for claims against state or municipal employers based on the 1972 amendments to
title VII. See notes 94 & 154 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 38-45 supra.
177. An even less compelling argument is that § 1981 should embody an "im-
pact" standard in the area of employment discrimination but not necessarily in
other areas. This argument is often based, by analogy, on an incorrect analysis of
the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to apply a different standard of proof
under the fourteenth amendment when dealing with certain specific areas, such as
cases involving race discrimination in selection of petit and grand juries. E.g., Tur-
ner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The jury selection cases were identified in
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights as cases in which evidence of intent
could come solely from proof of discriminatory impact because in such cases the
impact is usually unexplainable on grounds other than race. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
The holdings in the jury selection cases do not represent a decision that courts
should apply an "irpact" standard in certain areas and an "intent" standard in
others. Instead, these holdings constitute recognition that a showing of impact by
itself will be sufficient to prove intent to discriminate because, under the circum-
stances, the disproportionate impact could not possibly have resulted without pur-
poseful discrimination. This recognition is far different than carving out an entire
substantial area, such as employment discrimination, as one in which a showing of
disproportionate impact alone will be sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
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be rendered useless, or at best severely diluted, if a showing of
intentional discrimination were required.17 8 It is undoubtedly
true that intentional race discrimination is less obvious today and
that requiring proof of intent would greatly undercut the vitality
of section 1981 for civil rights litigants. It is also true that the
Supreme Court has recognized the subtle nature of facially neu-
tral practices that have a disparate racial impact and that this rec-
ognition was a significant factor in adopting the "effects" test for
title VII.179 Again, however, the same argument can be made for
section 1983, but that argument has not persuaded the Supreme
Court to adopt an "impact" standard for that important civil rights
statute.180 In light of the breadth of section 1981's application, this
argument would seem to be no more persuasive for section 1981
than it was for section 1983. Thus, particularly in light of the re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, these general practical policy ar-
guments do not appear to be of such overriding importance to the
Court that they mandate adoption of the "impact" standard for
section 1981.181
There are also two related practical policy arguments on behalf
of requiring proof of intentional discrimination for section 1981
claims. One argument focuses on the differences between section
1981 and title VII in the screening of claims. The other argument
involves the similarity between section 1981 and the fourteenth
amendment in broadness of scope and of application.
Title VII of the 1964 Act, as well as other titles of that Act and
the more recent civil rights legislation, contains a comprehensive
scheme of administrative procedures and remedies that a plaintiff
must exhaust prior to commencing an action in federal court.182
In addition, title VII and the EEOC regulations promulgated
178. A few post-Washington v. Davis lower court decisions have identified this
argument as a significant reason for holding that a prima facie case can be shown
under § 1981 based solely on proof of disproportionate impact. E.g., Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
3087 (1978).
179. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also note 12 supra.
180. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). See pt. rV supra.
181. This is not to say that the need for an "impact" standard to challenge the
effects of covert discrimination is an unimportant policy consideration. The need
is important for § 1981 as well as for any other civil rights statute. This need is
also the type of practical policy consideration that can provide justification for ju-
dicial approval of the "impact" standard for § 1981. However, like all such general
policy arguments, it does not require that the "impact". standard be adopted.
182. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1977). See note 27 supra.
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thereunder specifically identify the employment policies and
practices prescribed by the 1964 Act and delineate validation and
comprehensive afmrmative action requirements.183 The statutory
provisions for judicial redress of unlawful employment practices
are buffered by the extensive administrative exhaustion require-
ments, including administrative investigation and conciliation ef-
forts for each alleged violation. 84 Likewise, the provisions for
judicial enforcement of title VII are tempered by the comprehen-
sive EEOC regulations that specify what is necessary for em-
ployer compliance with title V1L.185 Because these administrative
mechanisms are designed to screen out frivolous and defective
claims and to notify employers of expected conduct, it can be ar-
gued that it is reasonable to provide that a prima facie case may
be established under title VII without proof of discriminatory in-
tent.
However, unlike title VII, no administrative screening of section
1981 claims takes place, and no regulations exist delineating what
conduct is deemed either to violate or to comply with section
1981.186 Nor is the language of section 1981 limited to a specific
area or type of conduct; it is broad and sweeping in scope. Thus,
the argument goes, as with claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment, the screening device for claims under section 1981 is the re-
quirement of proof of intent. 8 7
This argument can be challenged in a number of ways. Because
the EEOC rarely resolves a claim by conciliation and nearly al-
ways finds "reasonable cause,"' 8 8 and because a finding of "rea-
sonable cause" is not a prerequisite to litigation,189 the
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies under title
VII usually serves only as a delaying rather than as a screening
device. 90 Moreover, in light of the proliferation of title VII cases
in the federal courts, the effectiveness of both the administrative
screening and the comprehensive compliance regulations seems
questionable. Thus there is little empirical support for the first
part of this practical policy argument contrasting section 1981
with title VII. But at least these administrative procedures and
183. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-3, 2000e-12 to -17 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600,
1602-1607 (1977). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
184. See authorities cited note 182 supra.
185. See authorities cited note 183 mupra.
186. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
187. This argument found favor in the dissenting opinion in Davis v. County of
Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978).
188. See, e.g., [1972] EEOC ANN. REP.; H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2140.
189. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
190. See note 187 supra.
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regulations exist, and title VII is limited to employment discrimi-
nation. For it is not just the differences between section 1981 and
title VII that give this argument weight, but rather the similarities
between the scope of section 1981 and that of the fourteenth
amendment.
As discussed previously, section 1981 is not limited to employ-
ment discrimination or even to a limited notion of contract rights,
but is applicable to a wide variety of substantive areas and rela-
tionships.191 Because it is worded like an equal protection statute
and is applicable to private as well as to government-authorized
discrimination, its scope and reach regarding race discrimination
is in many respects much broader than that of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, assuming that
section 1981 embodies an "impact" standard, a plaintiff could eas-
ily avoid the requirement of intentional discrimination in Wash-
ington v. Davis and in Arlington Heights by alleging section 1981
instead of section 1983 or the fourteenth amendment. Although
nothing is inherently improper with this strategy, no more than in
pleading title VII when applicable instead of section 1983, such
use of section 1981 would frustrate one of the main justifications
set forth in Washington v. Davis for requiring proof of intentional
discrimination.
In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court was concerned that
if a showing of disproportionate racial impact alone would render
a facially neutral statute invalid absent compelling justification,
then it "would be far reaching and raise serious questions about,
and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public serv-
ice, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burden-
some to the poor or average black than to a more affluent
white."192 Because section 1981 extends to both public and pri-
vate contractual relationships and guarantees equality in a wide
variety of non-contractual areas,193 these same concerns and con-
191. See text accompanying notes 38-45 supra.
192. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). The Court also quoted from
studies that indicate that application of such an "impact" standard would perhaps
invalidate tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferments, jury service, and
government-conferred benefits as well as such things as sales taxes, bail sched-
ules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, minimum wage laws, and usury laws.
Id. at 248 n.14. Given the breadth of § 1981, many of these governmental items,
plus numerous additional private ones, would likewise be subject to challenge if
the Court approved an "impact" standard for § 1981.
193. The language of § 1981 guarantees much more than that all persons shall
have the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white persons.
Among other things, it guarantees that all persons "shall have the... full and
sequences would be present in even greater force were proof of
discriminatory intent not required for claims based on section
1981. As with all such general policy and practical arguments, the
Supreme Court can choose to accept or reject them based on to-
tally subjective criteria. But this last argument seems extremely
difficult to ignore or discard in the process of determining which
standard is appropriate for claims of race discrimination based on
section 1981.194
VI. CONCLUSION: How THE SUPREME COURT IS LIKELY TO DECIDE
THE ISSUE
In the previous section, the arguments for and against each
standard of proof have been set forth and analyzed. No single ar-
gument seems to carry the day for either standard. The analysis
of the legislative history and language of section 1981, when com-
pared to that of title VII, lends support to the requirement of
proof of intent, as do many of the more abstract policy and gen-
eral practical considerations. Moreover, the majority of lower
courts have ruled in favor of requiring the "intent" standard, fur-
ther illustrating support for that standard. Yet no single argu-
ment or combination of arguments is truly conclusive. Even
though the language and legislative history of section 1981 may
favor the "intent" standard, if the Supreme Court were disposed
to adopt the "impact" standard, it could justify such a holding on
any one of the more general purposive interpretations of the 1866
Act and its legislative history.195
Nonetheless, because of the far-reaching consequences of
adopting the "impact" standard for section 1981, it seems more
likely that the Court will require proof of intentional discrimina-
tion to sustain a prima facie case. Traditional modes of statutory
construction may give way, at least implicitly, to the fear that sec-
tion 1981 with an "impact" standard may replace the fifth and
equal benefit of all laws... for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." See note 14 supra.
194. Numerous lower federal courts have required proof of intentional discrimi-
nation under § 1981 because they view an "impact" standard for § 1981 as sub-
verting the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding for the fifth and fourteenth
amendments in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. E.g., Davis v. County
of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa.
1977). See, e.g., Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977);
Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mo. 1977), arfd sub nom. Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 579 (1978).
195. Indeed, it can be argued that that is precisely what the Court did in ap-
proving of the "effects" standard for title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
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fourteenth amendments. The concerns expressed in Washington
v. Davis would be multiplied because section 1981 applies to
purely private as well as to governmental conduct. Thus the very
importance of section 1981 to civil rights litigants-its broad reach
and application-may be a double-edged sword and cause the
Court to back away from the "impact" standard.
Adoption of the "intent" standard may not necessarily be the
death knell of section 1981. Even under the non-exhaustive list of
evidentiary factors set forth in Washington v. Davis and in Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
disproportionate racial impact is not irrelevant and, when com-
bined with some other indicia of intent, may be sufficient to prove
a prima facie case.19 6 Yet unquestionably many tests, policies,
and practices, such as the hypothetical arrest record policy, will
be immune from challenge under section 1981 because the only
provable evidence will be statistics showing disproportionate im-
pact. This immunity will result in a substantial and significant de-
crease in the effectiveness of section 1981 as a civil rights weapon.
Although the Supreme Court is perhaps most likely to require a
showing of intentional discrimination under section 1981, other
possibilities are available that would permit a plaintiff to prove a
prima facie case solely by disproportionate impact but that would
not invalidate every classification or practice that has such an im-
pact. One such possibility is to adopt a standard of proof for the
defendant that would not be as onerous as the "business neces-
sity" test under title VII or the "compelling state interest" test of
the equal protection clause.197 If the plaintiff were to show that
196. See note 81 supra.
197. This position is not inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). There the Court was concerned that adoption of an
"impact" standard for equal protection cases would subject facially neutral stat-
utes to the strict scrutiny of the "compelling state interest" test and public em-
ployment practices to the "business necessity" test. Id. at 248. The Court in
Washington v. Davis was faced with a choice between subjecting the defendants'
Test 21 to the traditional "rational basis" test, which almost never invalidates any-
thing, and the "compelling state interest" test, which almost always invalidates
everything. Given the choice of these two equal protection standards, the Court
realized the far-reaching consequences of applying the stricter test whenever a
plaintiff establishes disproportionate racial impact. However, if a defendant's bur-
den of justification were something less than the "compelling state interest" test
(or the "business necessity" test in employment discrimination cases), then the
Court's concerns about the use of the "impact" standard would be obviated. Al-
though the Washington v. Davis Court was locked in to a choice between the tradi-
tional and the strict scrutiny tests for equal protection cases, no such doctrinal
restriction is present in construing the burdens of proof for § 1981.
the defendant's policy had an adverse disproportionate racial im-
pact, then the plaintiff would have established a prima facie case,
and the burden would shift to the defendant. However, rather
than prove that the challenged policy is job-related and justified
by "business necessity" (or some other similarly strict standard
in a non-employment case), the defendant would need to prove
only that there was some credible, non-discriminatory reason for
adopting the challenged policy or practice.198 This use of the "im-
pact" standard for section 1981 is sensible and is one the Supreme
Court should adopt. It does not require the plaintiff to prove the
impossible, and it places the risk of non-persuasion regarding in-
tent on the defendant. Yet it does not subject every conceivable
policy and practice to the strict scrutiny of the title VII standards
or of the "compelling state interest" test.
In reality, this use of the "impact" standard might not require
much more of a searching inquiry than the traditional rational ba-
sis test requires when no race discrimination is shown,199 but at
least the defendant would not escape some burden of justification
simply because the plaintiff was unable to uncover acceptable
proof of intent to discriminate.200 Although such use of the im-
pact standard would lessen the vitality of section 1981 as a
weapon against race discrimination, it at least would not return
section 1981 to the relative obscurity of its first 100 years.
198. The defendant's burden in impact cases could be expressed in several
ways. At a minimum, the defendant should be required to prove that racial exclu-
sion was not the reason for adopting the challenged policy or practice and that the
policy or practice serves some other legitimate purpose. For a discussion of this
and of other burdens of proof for the defendant in impact cases, see Simon, Ra-
cially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional
Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1041 (1978); Note, The
Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud
on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L REv. 412, 431-32 (1978).
199. Under Washington v. Davis, even if those denied employment because of a
test with a disproportionate racial impact cannot prove race discrimination under
the Constitution, the classification-creating test must still be rationally related to
some legitimate governmental purpose. See 426 U.S. at 245-47.
200. This suggested standard of proof for the defendant, once the burden
shifted upon a showing of disproportionate racial impact, would not be as difficult
to satisfy as the defendant's burden when the plaintiff has proven intentional race
discrimination. Under the test set forth for the fourteenth amendment in Arling-
ton Heights, proof that a defendant's decision was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily require invalidation of the chal-
lenged conduct. Instead, such proof would shift the burden to the defendant to
prove that the same decision would have resulted even had the discriminatory mo-
tive not been considered. 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21. The precise nature of the defen-
dant's burden might vary depending on the nature of the claim, but the burden in
§ 1981 cases when the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination should be at
least as strict as that set forth in Arlington Heights.
